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The Moral Environment of the Law*
Charles Frankel**
I. LAW AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY
There is a much debated issue in the philosophy of law
which is fundamental to the theory of human liberty-the obligations of the law to morality. A free society confronts a kind
of chronic paradox. One of the most basic of liberties-perhaps
the one which, in the end, gives the most meaning to all the
others-is that of being permitted to live in accordance with
one's own lights, deciding for oneself what the standards of a
good life are, and behaving in conformity with those standards.
And yet, there obviously have to be limits to this liberty, and
not only because one individual's behavior can affect the liberties and rights of others.
A larger reason is that we are born as infants, absolutely
dependent on social support and yet, in Hobbes' pregnant
phrase, "unapt for society." We have needs and drives that
impel us to join with others, but the orientation and organization
of our desires so that they will not be mutually frustrating and
so that they will not interfere with, but will support, the inherited enterprises of civilization is in large measure a learned
skill. Society has to impart this skill generation after generation, preserving-recovering-the arts of self-regulation and
social intercourse from the impact of the new arrivals on its
scene. It has to decide, too, which of the old arts, the old truths,
the old values, have lost their authority and which are worth
reiteration. It is constantly engaged, therefore, in an educational and critical task, in part unconscious, in part conscious,
concerned with the transmission and redefinition of norms.
Nor can the individual perform the task of locating himself
in or against his surrounding culture entirely for himself. He
may disagree with many of his society's norms, find them constricting, painful, unreasonable, and wish to depart from them,
* This Article consists of two lectures delivered at the University
of Minnesota Law School on April 28-29, 1977, as the William B. Lockhart Lectures. Rights Reserved by Author.
** Old Dominion Professor of Philosophy and Public Affairs,
Columbia University School of Law.
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but if his society offers him no counsel, if it does not suggest with
some strength and clarity what it requires, prefers, permits, prohibits, the individual is left awash in an uncharted sea and cannot
even define an act of rebellion. He has no premises with which
to begin his search for his own individuality. Franz Kafka graphically described the condition of the individual thrown back
entirely on his own resources: "All is imaginary-family, office, friends, the street, all imaginary, far away or close at hand,
the woman; the truth that lies closest ... is only this, that you
are beating your head against the wall of a windowless and
doorless cell."' This condition is normlessness, anomie; it is a
painful condition for the individual and a destructive condition
when it becomes widespread in society at large.
What, then, is the proper function and sphere of the law
with regard to the protection, on one side, of the moral liberty of
individuals, and the protection, on the other side, of a structure
of clear, identifiable standards of moral conduct? By and large,
the discussion of this large question has revolved around three
sub-questions:
(1) What is the influence on law of the moral beliefs and
traditions of the community? This is an empirical issue.
(2) What is the responsibility of the law with regard to the
enforcement of morality? This is a normative matter.
(3) Ts there a set of higher moral principles that will tell
us what the law ought to try to enforce or protect and what it
should not? This issue, too, is obviously normative.
My concern in these lectures is principally with the two
normative questions-the legal enforcement of morality and the
relationship of the law to higher moral principles. But it may
be helpful in putting these issues in perspective if we first take
notice of one aspect of the empirical relationship between the
law and the moral standards of the community.
It is obviously true that the mores of a society influence its
laws. But the reverse relationship-the influence of the laws on
the mores-is of equal importance. This influence can be
particularly profound in contemporary societies, where the reach
of government is long, its presence is almost constantly visible,
and its authority comes mantled in the symbols and doctrine of
popular sovereignty. When, for example, the laws, seeking to
1. THE DAwRis or
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be nonpartisan with regard to controverted moral issues, come to
permit what has previously been prohibited-abortion, say, or
gambling, or business on Sundays-their impact is not felt to be,
nor is it in fact, nonpartisan. In its own terms the law may be
strictly neutral in the sense that it neither commands nor prohibits abortion, gambling, or business on Sundays. Nevertheless,
the new laws do not merely expand the options that individuals
may legally contemplate. They tend to change the perception of
previously prohibited acts. The tendency to think them sinful or
wrong loses the support of the law and, therefore, some of the
moral authority that the law's support had given it.
I offer this proposition as an assumption that I cannot
argue here. Nevertheless, it seems to me to be rooted in that
"robust common sense" on which Cardozo said that the evolution of the law depends, and it is only fair to admit that it will
control much of what I shall have to say. A plea for the
isolation of the law from the competition of moral ideas seems to
me like a plea for the isolation of the United States from the
economic and political rivalries of the international scene. To
follow such a policy would at once affect in multitudinous ways
the destinies of most nations on the planet, and saying that we
have no right to intrude on their affairs would not relieve us
from responsibility for the consequences of our escape to the
innocence of non-involvement. In practical terms, the choice
the law faces in regard to morals is like the choice the United
States faces in foreign affairs. It is not between the extremes of
total isolation and total involvement everywhere. It is a question of resources and priorities, of when to act, where, in what
way, and in accordance with what general principles or guidelines.
What, then, are the proper means and justifying circumstances, the principles and guidelines, by which the law should
direct its activities with regard to the enforcement of morality?
It will be best, I think, not to discuss this question purely abstractly, but to use a concrete issue as the material for generating,
if possible, some general answers. The issue that I shall choose
is the current heated debate in almost every part of our country
about the regulation of pornography and obscenity.
I do not choose this subject because I think it the most
important moral problem we confront, but because it offers a
peculiarly useful test of the meaning and validity of fundamental assumptions. My concern will not be primarily with constitutional questions but with the underlying philosophical and
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jurisprudential issues on which they turn. I should perhaps say
at this point, too, that you will be wrong if you infer from what
I am shortly going to argue that I am a strong advocate of
censorship. It happens that I am unable to persuade myself that
the arguments commonly offered by libertarians are sound, but
it also happens that, on the practical issue of censorship, I am in
general sympathy with the libertarians. Of course, you may ask
why I should worry about people's premises and arguments
when I am in agreement with them on the practical results. To
this I can only say that, apart from the merits or demerits of the
particular arguments I offer, I shall have accomplished my main
purpose in these lectures if I persuade some of you that a
jurisprudential preoccupation with premises and principles may
have its own interest and utility.
In this discussion of pornography and obscenity I set aside
the private possession of pornographic materials and the private
indulgence in obscene conduct. The individual's right to privacy, as the Supreme Court found in Stanley v. Georgia,2 seems to
me the controlling consideration in this area. My concern is
with the pornographic in public gathering places such as bookstores, theatres, and bars, with pictures and performances in
which individuals engage in obscene acts, and with the advertising of such pornography on the streets and in the public press.
Broadly, the questions I wish to ask fall into the area mapped by
the late Alexander Bickel, when he wrote:
Never mind whether books get girls pregnant, or whether
sexy or violent movies turn men to crime. Assume that they
do not, or that, at any rate, there are plenty of other efficient
causes of pregnancy and crime. Assume further that we must
protect privacy ....
Take these assumptions, and still you are left with at least
one problem of large proportions. It concerns the tone of the
society, the mode, or to use terms that have perhaps greater currency, the style and quality of life, now and in the future ...
[I]f [a man] demands a right to obtain the [obscene] books and
pictures he wants in the market, and to foregather in public
places-discreet, if you will, but accessible to all-with others
who share his tastes, then to grant him his right is to affect the
world about the rest of us, and to impinge on other privacies.
Even supposing that each of us can, if he wishes, effectively
avert the eye and stop the ear (which, in truth, we cannot),
what is commonly read and
seen and heard and done intrudes
3
upon us all, want it or not.

2. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
3. Bickel, On Pornography: I1. Dissenting and Concurring Opinions, 22

PuB. INT REST 25, 25-26 (1971).
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Is this environmental effect of public pornography a fit
subject for legal regulation? The arguments about this question
sharply divide our society; they also reveal our own divided
minds. This is the era of environmental law, and beyond
concern for the physical environment, including its aesthetic
qualities, government and law have assumed vast parental and
tutelary responsibilities with regard to the social environment.
In countless ways the laws limit our freedom, and do so, it is
claimed, for our own good. 4 Nor have many libertarians commonly opposed this paternalistic trend in the laws by invoking
John Stuart Mill's classic liberal maxim that the individual's
"own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant ' 5
for such intrusions on his sphere of liberty. Yet when we turn
to the protection of the moral environment in which we live,
work, play, and educate our children and ourselves, the banners
of laissez faire go up on the flagpoles. According to Chief Justice
Warren, a man not noted for his anti-libertarian views, there is
a "right of the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent
society .... -6 Yet the legal regulation of the moral environment, it is very widely held, involves impermissible encroachments on fundamental individual rights.
At least at first blush, the situation would strike an outside
observer as puzzling. Historically, it has been the moral environment that has received the major public attention, as evidenced in the provision for public schools, the supervision of the
conditions of labor of women and children to protect them from
corrupting influences, and the rules against the possession and
dissemination of pornographic materials. Some of this concern,
it can be said, has rested on questionable assumptions and
superstitious fears. But if there were an iron-clad prohibition
against the making of laws that rest on questionable assumptions
and superstitious fears, the history of economic legislation, conservative and liberal, would be very different from what it is.
Moreover, one of the principles of traditional educational theory
and social psychology that contemporary liberal philosophers
have most strenuously reaffirmed is that the general environment.-"what is commonly read and seen and heard and done"
-is likely to have a greater influence on people's personal4. In "Blue-Sky Laws," for example, or in keeping cyclamates off
the market.
5.

J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (The World's Classics ed. 1912).

6. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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ities, goals, and behavior than any specific lessons they may be
taught by parents or teachers, and that public funds and the
public force, therefore, may and should be used to provide the
right physical, emotional, and cultural surroundings for the development of socially desirable habits and attitudes.
In practical terms as well, liberal thinkers themselves have
been far from constant in their adherence to a counsel of laissez
faire. Let me cite some remarks by two liberal writers, John P.
Roche and Milton M. Gordon, in 1955, commenting on the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education,7 which
outlawed racial segregation in the schools:
Opponents of the desegregation decision ... cite the dismal
failure of Prohibition as a case in point, urging that basic social
change-however desirable-must come from the bottom, from
a shift in "grass-roots" convictions.
On the other hand, the court's supporters maintain that virtually every statute and judicial decree is, to some extent, a regulation of morality. Indeed, they suggest, if the moral standards
of individuals were not susceptible to state definition and regulation, we would never have emerged from primitive barbarism .... 8

I do not know the views of Messrs. Roche and Gordon on
the question of the regulation of pornography. But I do know
that many who shared their views in 1955 would today vigorously assert the principle that the law should stay away from the
regulation of morality. What reasons are put forward as requiring us to adopt this hands-off attitude towards an obtrusive
feature of our external environment?

One is that pornography and obscenity are forms of speech
or expression and must therefore be granted full freedom. Let
us begin our analysis with an inspection of this principle. In
the majority report of the congressionally authorized and presidentially appointed Commission on Obscenity and Pornography,
for example, the statement is made that "[c] oercion, repression
and censorship in order to promote a given set of views are not
tolerable in our society."9 In conformity with this principle, the
7. 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
8. Roche & Gordon, Can Morality be Legislated?, N. Y. Times, May
22, 1955, at 10 (Magazine).
9.

W.

PORNOGRAPHY

inafter

LOCKHART, REPORT OF THE COMISSION ON OBSCEITY AND

56-57 (New York Times-Random House ed. 1970) [here-

cited as LOCKHART COMMISSION REPORT].
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Commission majority recommended, inter alia, that all federal,
state, and local legislation prohibiting the sale, exhibition, or
distribution of sexual materials to consenting adults should be
repealed.' 0
But can we accept the principle that coercion, repression, and
censorship in order to promote a given set of views are not
tolerable in our society? Sympathetic as one may be with the
intentions behind it, it does not withstand scrutiny, I submit,
unless substantial qualifications are added to it. At least prima
facie, for example, there is a conflict between this principle and
the laws restricting the access to the airwaves of people who
favor cigarette smoking. Again, in almost all public schools the
sympathetic portrayal of heterosexual love, within conventional
limits of decorum, is permitted and applauded. Not so, however,
with homosexual alternatives. And while there are objections
to one or another such restriction, I am acquainted with no one,
however libertarian, who would argue that all such restrictions
on the free flow of opinions should be removed.
In fact, of course, there are many legal restrictions on the
free flow of opinions that are commonly accepted. There are
truth-in-advertising laws; I cannot maliciously defame other people; I cannot employ "fighting words" in certain circumstances;
I cannot invade people's privacy without the presence of strong
excusing or justifying conditions. Despite the strong position
accorded to free expression by our laws, the expression of opinion
is regulated, and the regulation is conducted against the background of a balancing of interests and of the assumption that
some interests are significant enough even to prevail, on occasion,
against the interest in free expression. In this sense, the law's
function as a judge and teacher of comparative values-in other
words, a moral arbiter-seems to me inescapable, and it is exercised even in relation to freedom of expression.
Consider, indeed, what libertarians themselves commonly
concede. In relation to pornography and obscenity, they agree
that regulation of freedom of expression is justified where the
interests of children are concerned. In doing so, they concede
more than they recognize. Let me set aside the grave practical
problems in a society like ours in erecting effective protections
10. LOCKHART COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 62. President
Nixon, needless to say, roundly condemned the majority report, and it
was rejected by the Senate by a vote of sixty to five. Among the five
dissenters, however, were the 1972 Democratic presidential candidate,
Senator George McGovern, and the present Vice President, Walter
Mondale. 116 CONG. REC. 36478 (1970).
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for children while still preserving the rights of adults to read, see,
and hear what they wish. Let me concentrate simply on the
logical implications of the concession. The state is accorded the
right to intrude on communications to children, presumably on
the ground that children may be harmed by such communications
and are not old enough to make a reasonable judgment about
running these risks. But we must note that the law allows
children to be exposed, in books and films and on television, to
an extraordinary array of ideas-religious, irreligious, chauvinistic, nihilistic, xenophobic, ruggedly individualistic, bleeding-heart
humanitarian-take your choice. It can hardly be argued that all
these ideas are safe and sane, or incapable of poisoning tender
minds. Why, then, do we deny the right of the law to regulate
the entire intellectual and moral diet of children, but concede its
right to do so where sexual behavior and mores are concerned?
The only available answer to this question that I can see is that
deference is being paid to certain of the more strongly established
moral principles of our society.
Nor can such protective legislation for children be justified
purely on the ground that only the special interests of children
are involved. We do not make the effort to protect minors from
the seductions of sado-masochism only because they are too
young to understand its risks and may hurt themselves experimenting with its techniques. We do so in the belief that torture
is also bad for adults, that a general social taste for it is to be
discountenanced, and that, as an educational matter, the formation and spread of that taste should be discouraged. If the law
should not intrude on private sado-masochistic relations between
consenting adults, this is because there are countervailing principles-for example, rights of privacy-that weigh against such
a policy. It is not because the law can reasonably be expected
to be uniformly neutral in regard to sado-masochism or its
public expression. rn sum, if intrusions on the free communication of pornographic materials are justified where children are
concerned, it appears to me that we implicitly concede the
validity of broad principles that libertarians seem frequently inclined to contest-to wit, that pornography is identifiable, that it
has a doubtful moral legitimacy not only for children but for
adults, and that, other things being equal, this doubtful moral
legitimacy may justify at least some interferences with free expression.
These considerations bear on still another question raised
by the use of the free speech clause to shelter the dissemination
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of pornographic materials. Restrictions on speech are commonly accepted as permissible where the speech fades into conduct.
But the line between "speech" and "conduct" does not draw
itself, and in the case of performed pornography it is particularly
difficult to draw. As Alexander Bickel asked, is Oh! Calcutta
It is worth recalling that Justice Hugo
speech or conduct?"
Black, who thought the first amendment gave an absolute and
unqualified protection to freedom of speech, concurred in a
dissenting opinion in which it was declared that carrying, in a
courthouse, a jacket expressing a political message in obscene
language was an "absurd and immature antic . . . mainly conduct and little speech."' 2 The intrusions of the law on freedom of
pornographic expression where the interests of children are concerned rests in part, I believe, on the recognition that such
expression, often if not always, is more than expression. It is
provocation, seduction, pandering-an act and not just the espousal of an idea, if indeed the espousal of ideas has anything to
do with it at all. And this brings us to an important aspect of
pornography where adults are concerned.
Obviously, we must be careful not to use expressions like
"provocation," "seduction," or "pandering" loosely in relation to
pornographic appeals to mature adults. To do so is to deny to
adults legal and moral status as autonomous beings and to raise
profound problems for a system of law based on the concepts of
individual liberty and responsibility. There are two respects,
however, in which public pornography can be conceived of as action, not speech, and in which the protection of the rights of
mature adults provides at least a threshold justification for its
regulation. These two aspects are its shock effects and its intrusions on privacy.
Let me bring to my support some words of Professor
Thomas I. Emerson of Yale, whose dedication to freedom of
expression is not unknown:
If an obscene communication is forced upon another person
against his will it can have a "shock effect" and such a communication can properly be described as "action." . . . A communi-

cation of this nature, imposed upon a person contrary to his
wishes, has all the characteristics of a physical assault. The
harm is direct, immediate, and not controllable by regulating
Moreover, from a slightly different
subsequent action ....
point of view, forcing obscenity upon another person constitutes
an invasion of his privacy, and for that reason also falls outside
the system of freedom of expression. The distinction between
11. Bickel, supra note 3, at 27.

12. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dis-

senting).
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this area of conduct and the expression protected by the First
Amendment 13
touches a limited but central feature of the obscenity problem.
The law does not protect me from unsolicited intrusions
on my attention from people pressing political or religious literature on me that I may find disagreeable. This is because there
is an established social interest in freedom of political and religious expression. Is there an analogously overriding social interest
in leaflets advertising skin-flicks, topless bars, and massage parlors? Perhaps, but the case has to be made, and to make it we
have to weigh the interests in conflict and make a moral judgment about their relative importance. The law gives no special
first amendment protection to commercial billboards or to handing out leaflets advertising new model vacuum cleaners. My
right to freedom of expression does not protect me if I accost a
stranger on the street and sprinkle him with obscenities. Why
does it protect me, then, if I put up a sign that presses pornographic images upon him?

These questions about public pornography and obscenity as
they relate to freedom of expression carry us to the second main
line of defense for freedom for public pornography. Apart
from the issue of free speech, does the law have the right to
regulate conduct that falls within the sphere of private tastes
and beliefs? Must we not accept the principle that the law has no
business regulating the conduct of adults where that conduct can
be shown to involve no identifiable harm to other adults or
where, if it does affect them, their consent has been obtained?
Once again, we confront a principle, it seems to me, which is as
much honored in the breach as in the practice.
The laws make large intrusions into the sphere of personal
tastes-there are, for example, laws that make battery a crime
whether or not a masochistic victim has invited it, laws that prohibit bigamy even when all the parties involved have given their
consent, and laws against voluntarily entering into contracts of
peonage or slavery. 1 4 But let us take a simpler example, and one
13. T. EMERSON,
(footnote omitted).

THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF

14. Patrick Devlin, in

ExPREssION 496 (1970)

THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS

explored these issues at length.

(1959), has
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of more immediate relevance to most of us-the largely uncontested right of the state, in the interest of our health, to restrict
our options and remove, for example, saccharins from the market.
The normal libertarian defense of such paternalistic legislation is
that it does not involve morals but is concerned with a clear and
identifiable harm and that the state may legitimately act as our
guardian where such indisputable harm is involved. But the
trouble with this defense is that the concept of "health" is not a
morally neutral concept like "height" or "weight." It is freighted
with moral presuppositions.
Consider the individual who thinks that the advertising of
X-rated films should be prohibited. He is likely to say that
viewing such films, in and of itself, is an unhealthy act, an
impairment of personality. It is a harm to the individual as
immediate and dangerous as rubbing sand in his eyes or shooting heroin into his veins. To this the common response is that
before we can accept the proposition that pornography is hazardous to the health we must be shown a definite correlation
between the viewing of pornography and identifiable physical,
psychological, or social pathologies. Well and good: there may
be reasons for adopting this view of the matter rather than the
Puritan's. But we must note what kind of view it is. We have
not offered empirical evidence adverse to the verdict of the
Puritan; we have offered an alternative definition of health, a
definition that depends on rejecting the Puritan's moral presuppositions and substituting others. For if an identification of
pornography with emotional impairment clearly involves a particular moral outlook, so does a point of view which treats
pornography as morally and medically neutral. In general, the
term "health" cannot be severed from the social and moral context in which it is used. The priestess of the Oracle of Delphi,
seated over the fumes of burning drugs and babbling mysterious
words, was not regarded as intoxicated or demented but inspired.
The slippage into unargued moral assertion seems to me a
repeated characteristic of discussions of these issues by libertarian writers. In his critique of Lord Patrick Devlin's avowedly
moralistic approach, 15 for example, Professor H.L.A. Hart's
major object is to show that the law may not be used to enforce
private morality as such;' " but since Professor Hart, like John
Stuart Mill before him, does not use the word "private" in this
context to designate simply behavior in the solitude of one's home,
15.
16.

P. DzVLN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959).
H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963).
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but means instead some domain of rules and conduct that are the
individual's own business whether he is in his home or in public
places, the statement presupposes an antecedent moral code
which gives content to the word "private" and to the distinction
between "private" and "public." Similarly, what is the message conveyed by the phrase "morality as such"? Does "morality
as such" mean simply a set of standards holding that certain
actions are wrong independent of their specific consequences?
If so, the statement that the sphere of "morality as such" is
no business of the law is surely too large a formula to be defended. The law holds surreptitious entry to be wrong regardless of whether any specifiable damage is done other than the
entry itself, and it takes a similar view on other matters. Or
does the phrase "morality as such" refer to a set of standards
defining wrong conduct that are simply offered dogmatically
and without independent support? But to assign the views that
some people hold about sexual conduct to this sphere of dogmatic morality is to make a judgment about their standards, a judgment that is itself put forward without argument. Moreover, the
entire question whether there are actions that are intrinsically
right or wrong is one of the centrally debated, and unsettled,
issues in moral philosophy.
Indeed, the concept of "morality as such," dismissed by
Professor Hart as outside the proper sphere of legal enforcement,
creeps back into his own arguments. He asserts, to take a
striking example, that existing legal prohibitions against even
consensual bigamy are consistent with the principle that the law
should stay out of the sphere of private moral conduct. A principal reason, he argues, is that such prohibitions are merely designed to prevent an affront to people's feelings, in other words,
to prevent a public nuisance. 1 7 But the public exhibition of affection between members of different races can also be an affront
to people's feelings in some parts of the United States, yet we
should surely not wish to classify that as a public nuisance. Can
the ideas of "nuisance," "public decency," and "public order" be
severed from a moral judgment as to the legitimacy and worth
of the offended feelings in question? I find it difficult to see
how; and for this reason I am doubtful that a neat line can be
drawn between people's purely personal tastes and those tastes
upon which the law may legitimately pass judgment.' 8
17. Id. at 41.
18. See Nagel, The Enforcement of Morals, in MORAL
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 137, 154-57 (P. Kurtz ed. 1969).
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Other illustrations of the same unacknowledged moralism
can be found in the defenses of the libertarian position offered
by Herbert Packer and by my Columbia colleague, and predeces19
Professor Packer
sor as Lockhart Lecturer, Louis Henkin.
be made subject
not
argues that a given form of conduct should
because it is
primarily
even
to the criminal sanction "purely or
' 20
We ought to know what its "bad efthought to be immoral.
fects" are, and these must be the secular harm it does. But he
does not define secular harm. Does it mean a harm that would
be recognized as a harm no matter what the observer's religious
beliefs? But surely even secular observers will agree that pictures of children engaged in sexual intercourse involve a "harm"
in some sense of that term, and they would maintain this view
even if it could be shown that the children suffer no subsequent
bad effects. The word "secular" seems to be simply a secular
way of sanctifying a particular set of moral beliefs while putting
other beliefs under a ban. Similarly, Professor Henkin argues
that due process of law requires that legislation have a proper
-public purpose, and he defines this as a "rational, utilitarian
social purpose." 21 But not everyone agrees-not even all rational
observers-that a "rational purpose" is always a "utilitarian purpose," and in the absence of some clearer definition of what is
meant, the phrase reads like a blank check. In the absence of
a presupposed moral code, I am unable to fill in the missing
amount.
I would emphasize that I admire the work of Professors Hart,
Packer, and Henkin very much, and my own practical views are
not far from theirs. But in the approach they take to the question of the legal enforcement of morality, two fundamental mistakes, it seems to me, are present. The first is the question of
what is meant by "harm." The term cannot be adequately defined without moral premises, and to this extent the law cannot
escape taking a moral point of view. The second is that, in the
perspective they offer, it is only harmful individual conduct that
is considered pertinent to the discussion: as they see the matter,
some clear correlation has to be established between, say, pornographic displays and the encouragement of undesirable individual
conduct. But this approach misses one of the central functions
19. Professor Henkin delivered the Lockhart Lectures on April 2829, 1976, at the University of Minnesota Law School. For the text of
the lectures, see Henkin, ConstitutionalFathers-ConstitutionalSons, 60
MINN. L. REV. 1113 (1976).
20.

H. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 267 (1968).

21. Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 391, 402 (1963).
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of anti-pornographic legislation-protection of society's norms
by giving adequate instructions to all members of society about
what that society approves and disapproves. In the words of
Louis B. Schwartz, "The interest being protected is not, directly
or exclusively, the souls of those who might be depraved or
corrupted by the obscenity, but the rights of parents to shape
the moral notions of their children, and the right of the general
'22
public not to be subjected to violent psychological affront.
The fault, in short, is in trying to discuss individual rights and
liberties independently of any consideration of larger public purposes and, specifically, a public interest in the moral environment.
The argument presupposes precisely the principle that has to be
explicitly defended-namely, that a public interest in the moral
environment is prima facie illegitimate, irrational, or "nonutilitarian."
Public pornography causes economic damage; it spawns
crime and ugliness; it thrives on the victimization, by drugs,
duress, and other means, of many of the persons directly involved. But even if, despite all this, we accept the characterization of public pornography as "victimless," fundamental questions remain. We have laws against cockfighting. Can we say
that the reason for these laws is simply that the suffering of
roosters is a secular harm that outweighs the human pleasure
derived from the spectacle? I take it that we are doing more
than this; we are passing an adverse judgment on the nature of
that pleasure. We do not, after all, have laws against fishing. It
is the norms of a society that we are enforcing, secular or nonsecular, utilitarian or non-utilitarian. Again, we have laws
against bareknuckle prize fighting. How many of us would be
willing to permit such fights provided only that the fighters
consented and were amply rewarded? Clearly, there are some
moral norms we wish to enforce whether or not there are dissenters, and whether or not the element of consent is present.
What, then, puts pornographic displays in a compartment
of their own? In the great majority of cases they involve the
degradation and depersonalization of the individuals involved,
and-a point not unnoticed by feminists-in most cases these
individuals are women.23 Surely no one will say that spectacles
22. Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 CoLuM.
L. REv. 669, 681 (1963).
23. I quote the report of a respected film and theater critic who
has seen a representative sample of X-rated films: "[Essentially those
films seem to me acts of vindictiveness by men against women in return
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of this sort-whose existence and character are forced on the
attention of anyone who walks on the streets of our central cities
or reads our newspapers-are congenial to the moral sensibilities
that we should like to be dominant in our society. The question,
then, is why they should be exempt from regulation. And the
answer cannot be, if my remarks to this point have any validity,
that the law has no business regulating morality. The option of
moral isolationism is not available to it.

But I ask this question as an open question. Let me now
turn to the other side of the issue. A minority of the Commission on Pornography and Obscenity stated its disagreement with
the majority report in the following words:
The basic question is whether and to what extent society may
establish and maintain certain moral standards. If it is conceded
that society has a legitimate concern in maintaining moral standards, it follows logically that government has a legitimate interest in at least attempting to protect
such standards against any
source which threatens them. 24

I agree with the first clause in the second sentence of this statement. But I do not at all believe that the second clause "follows
logically" from the first. It would follow only if there were no
other legitimate interests that were countervailing. The collision
of otherwise legitimate interests is one of the simple reasons why
law and morals in general are not geometrical sciences.

There is, first of all, the simple but weighty consideration of
economy. The law's resources are limited. It is true, as Lord
Patrick Devlin argues, that a society is in part a community of
belief in certain moral ideas. 2 5 But it is not true that an attack

on any one of these ideas is akin to an attack on the necessary
foundations of society. A general indifference to pornography
does mean, I believe, the disappearance of feelings and relationships of great importance in our lives. But the law has many
things to do, and it almost certainly cannot make a concerted
for the sexual restrictions and taboos of our society and for the cruelties

of women toward men that those restrictions have produced. The vin-

dictiveness is essentially mean-spirited and exploitative." Kauffman,
On Pornography: 1I. Dissenting and Concurring Opinions, 22 PuB. INTEREST 28, 31 (1971).
24. LOcKHART CoMmissIoN REPORT, supra note 9, at 457

(statements by Morton A. Hill and Winfrey C. Link, concurred in by Charles
H. Keating, Jr).
25. DEvLm, supra note 15, at 10-11.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:921

effort to stamp out pornography without neglecting other social
evils of even more urgent importance.
Moreover, other serious evils are likely to follow from the
effort of an overburdened legal system to enforce prohibitions
against activities for which, obviously, there is a strong public
demand. As the history of Prohibition indicates, the enforcement of such prohibitions usually becomes highly selective. The
vice of legal arbitrariness rears its ugly head. Moreover, as Professor Packer has pointed out,2 6 when even a limited number of
people have a strong urge to engage in an activity, legal prohibitions against it tend to produce a "ripple effect" of illegality.
This has been the case with gambling and the banning of marijuana as well as with restrictions on pornography. Running such
risks is perhaps reasonable where there is a widespread public
consensus that, despite the strong addiction of some to the condemned activity, it is a clear-cut social evil. But in the case of
pornography, as in the case of gambling and marijuana, that
consensus is unclear. There is large, though by no means universal, agreement that pornography is deplorable. But with regard to whether it is a serious enough social evil to warrant legal
efforts to stamp it out, the consensus is patchy at best. And it
becomes even patchier when severe criminal penalties are imposed on offenders. No matter how morally wicked the offenders
may be thought to be, they may tend also, in our society, to be
regarded as victims of a punishment that does not fit the crime.
Thus, the enforcement of severe laws against pornography may
well produce an effect opposite to that intended. It may induce
a perception of those who are punished as martyrs and thus
reduce, not reinforce, the perception of pornography as a serious
evil.
We come here, I believe, to one of the fundamental issues
affecting the legal enforcement of morality. It is one thing to say
that a society has the right to enforce-and indeed cannot avoid
enforcing-moral norms that are felt intensely and about which
there is very general agreement. Despite widespread deviations
from the norm of monogamous marriage, for example, and despite
unfavorable views of the norm itself that have been put forward
by a number of contemporary sociologists-one treatise notes it
may come to be viewed as "a form of emotional and sexual malnutrition" 2 7 -it would be surprising, and I think deplorable, if the
26.
27.

H. PACKER, supra note 20, at 359.
BEYOND
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34 (J.R. Smith &L.G. Smith eds. 1974).
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laws did not provide in a variety of ways preferential treatment
to the institution of monogamous marriage. But it is another
thing to enforce moral norms that are the subject of considerable
dissent. This can aggravate the dissension and put minorities
at the mercy of tyrannical majorities. As I have indicated, I am
not persuaded by the argument that we should not take "moral
harms" into consideration unless they can also be shown to be
"secular" or "utilitarian" harms. But the instinct behind these
cautions is a sound pragmatic one. Where the regulation of
people's moral behavior is concerned, it is usually prudent policy
to seek the widest, least tendentious basis for agreement before
plunging into the difficult and socially disruptive task of reg28
ulating the morals of some to satisfy the preferences of others.
But this is a pragmatic consideration, as are all the others I
have put before you. Is there also a reason not simply of high
expedience but of higher principle that weighs against the prohibition of public pornography? Well, reasons of high expedience, as John Stuart Mill observed, are not easily distinguished
from reasons of principle. Still, there does seem to me one
consideration that everyone will recognize as a consideration of
principle. It is a just claim upon a legal system-and an
expression of what I take to be a fundamental moral norm of
our society-that individuals be given fair and reasonably clear
advance notice of the kind of conduct that can subject them to
legal penalties. That obscenity and pornography laws often fail
in this regard will not be news. A film by Walt Disney containing a scene of a mother buffalo giving birth in a snowstorm was
once banned in Chicago. 29 Nor can the Supreme Court's search
for an operable definition of obscenity be said to have met with
success. As Justice Harlan once observed, "the subject of obscenity has produced a variety of views among the members of
the Court unmatched in ... constitutional adjudication." 30 The
late Justice Black's words, in his dissenting opinion in Ginzburg
v. United States,3 1 are even more poignant: "[N] ot even the most
learned judge much less a layman, is capable of knowing in
advance of an ultimate decision in his particular case ...
whether certain material comes within the area of 'obscenity' as
28. Of course, this presupposes that individuals adversely affected
by the moral behavior in question can exercise some reasonable measures of self-protection. We cannot wait for a consensus on the moral
legitimacy of racial equality before taking action.
29. For this and other examples, see H. ABRAHAm , FRmom AND
THE COURT 175-76 (2d ed. 1972).
30. Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704-05 (1968).
31, 383 US. 463 (1966).
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that term is confused by the Court today. '3 2 The problem of
definition is fundamental and it is not easy to solve. Justice
Potter Stewart has said that he knows hard-core pornography
33
when he sees it,
but unless we can arrange to have him present
on every occasion when people are deciding whether they are
breaking an obscenity law, his pronouncement does not do us
much good. The reason of principle that weighs most heavily
against obscenity legislation is due process of law. The due
process clause much more than the free speech clause is the
source, in my view, of reasonable hesitations regarding the
regulation of pornography.

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to conclude that absolutely nothing can or should be done. In relation to performed
or photographed pornography-the most obtrusive kinds of pornography-I am inclined to think it is possible to write statutes
that will indicate with reasonable precision what is meant by
pornography in the legal sense and that will not bring statues by
Michelangelo, erotic drawings by Picasso, or plays like Marat/
Sade under the axe. Admittedly, in different areas of the country, there will be differences of opinion about what should be
defined as "pornographic." Provided that constitutional guarantees of due process are met, this seems to me simply an argument, at any rate in the case of films, photographs, and live
entertainment, for leaving the options to states and municipalities.
Nor is placing pornography under a ban the only option.
3 4
There is the alternative strategy of simply zoning pornography.
This is sufficient to accomplish what I believe are the two main
and defensible functions of antipornography legislation: first,
the protection of the rights of the unwary and the unwilling to
use the public thoroughfares without being psychically assaulted; second, the assertion of the public bias in favor of certain
moral ideas. There was a time when people with allergies to
tobacco smoke had their interests subordinated to those of
32. Id. at 480-81.
33. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
34. The Supreme Court approved a zoning scheme that required
dispersal of "adult" motion picture theaters in Young v. American MiniTheatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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smokers. The balance has been shifted. A similar rationale
can be used to shift the balance with regard to pornography.
It may be futile and foolish to seek to stamp out pornography,
but it is not futile or foolish for a society to seek to signal its
preferences through its laws. Not all legal restrictions, after all,
can be explained as efforts to abolish the conduct at which they
are aimed. Laws against incest or suicide, or taxes on gambling,
can certainly not be justified in this way. They are expressions
and reinforcements of a moral code, cues to the young, the confused, and the disoriented about society's feelings and beliefs.
It may be said that measures of this sort directed against
pornography will be disruptive. But the spread of unregulated
commercialized pornography has been deeply disruptive. It will
be said that pornography is hard to define, that its immorality is
debatable, and that, in fact, it is a subjective phenomenon existing
only in the eye of the beholder. I find these replies less than
convincing. Whatever its standing under the free speech and
due process clauses, obscenity has legal recognition. There are,
for example, well-known gestures which everybody recognizes
as obscene, which are understood to be insulting and aggressive,
and which, if used, remove a man's right to say that he has been
the victim of unprovoked assault. Nor are the norms defining
pornography and obscenity entirely dependent on individual
points of view. There is all but universal agreement, for example, that bestiality and pedophilia are obscene.
To be sure, I am aware of the position-who in our society
today could not be?-that the belief in the immorality of pornography is a reflection of an ugly Puritanism and that it is held
by people who have "difficulty accepting their own sexuality."35
But this is a speculative argument and an ad hominem one; like
most such arguments it can be turned against those who make it.
Such evidence as we have suggests, at the very least, that those
who purvey or regularly seek pornography are suffering from the
same ailment. Nor do the conventional arguments that pornography is harmless meet the point. It can be said that pornography "seems to provide a relief rather than a stimulant,"36
and that it cannot be shown to be a causal agent in sexual assaults
or other socially undesirable behavior. But even if we should
grant the truth of these propositions, they ignore two of the
35. Etzioni, Porn is Here to Stay, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1977, at 33,
col. 2.
36. Id.
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basic issues under debate. First, unlike pornographic words,
pornographic pictures and performances exploit living people,
including children. Second, the prevention of specific individual
crimes is not the only concern of those who find public
pornography a disturbing phenomenon. They are equally concerned with the brutalizing effects on public tastes and the public
environment of the genial tolerance of commercialized sexual,
sado-masochistic, and exhibitionist performances, and with its
impact on social norms.
But what about these norms and the impact upon them
of public pornography? Is public pornography sufficiently
important to merit even the minimal attention by the law that
I have been considering? This, of course, is the ultimate issue,
and to examine it, we must give a moment's attention to the
social significance of obscenity. I see little value in the studied,
leering exploitation of the obscene, but I believe there are redeeming social values in obscenity itself. It is neither an unqualified evil nor a mere ripple of eccentricity on the surface of
social relations. It serves an important purpose, but in order to
serve this purpose it needs a corpus of reasonably firm norms
against which to operate.
All societies and most individuals require escape hatches
from the mores and rules. Indeed, human customs usually
make explicit provision for breaking rules. They establish special rules declaring that, given certain conditions, violations of
the rules are permissible. This is conspicuously the case with
sexual and religious mores. Carnivals, danses macabres, the story
told in a whisper, court jesters, beloved life-giving mischiefmakers like Pan, Puck, and Harpo Marx, are well-nigh universal
in human cultures. The obscene is an escape hatch. Just as
there are moments when nothing but a blasphemous oath will
satisfy the needs of expression, so there are occasions when the
sanctities veer into the sanctimonious, and everyone can breathe
more easily because the conventions have been broken and someone has uttered a forbidden thought or given vent to feelings
ordinarily suppressed. Aristophanes, Rabelais, Shakespeare, and
D. H. Lawrence, all of them authors of works in which there are
passages that can be called obscene, are benefactors of mankind.
But if what I have just said has any validity, there are two
categories of obscenity-the one permissible, even desirable, the
other impermissible and undesirable. Under certain conditions,
words, images, or acts otherwise prohibited lose their stain. They
are still surrounded with taboos, but because the appropriate
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conditions of form, context, time, and circumstance are met, the

breach of the taboo is sanctioned. Thus, part of Aristotle's argument in his Poetics against Plato's proposals for censoring the
arts consists of his effort to show that Plato ignores the special
conditions that, in an integrated work of art, make otherwise
blasphemous or obscene utterances therapeutic and useful in the
education of the individual and the governance of a good society.3 7
Often we do not use the word "obscene" for such permitted
violations of the norms. Legal efforts to define "obscenity," for
example, are usually intended to remove such permitted violations from the category of the obscene. But whether or not we
use the word "obscene" to characterize them, it is plain that they
inhabit a half-world in between what social norms prohibit and
what these norms encourage, a world with its own special rules.
This is the difficulty that obscenity presents from the standpoint
of the law. For while some of the rules are fairly well understood, others are much more difficult to articulate. Specialists
in the arts and literature disagree about them, and censors, juries,
and judges can hardly be expected to be sophisticated about them.
This is why prudence is called for in the legal regulation of
obscenity. Undeniably, there is a "slippery slope" problemanti-pornography legislation easily becomes a vehicle of expression for prigs, philistines, and prudes. But as Holmes once remarked, "people in the law as elsewhere hate to recognize that
most questions-I think I might say all legal questions-are questions of degree."3 8 And he went on to add: "I have just sent back
an opinion of one of our JJ. with a criticism of an argument in it
of the 'where are you going to draw the line' type-as if all
decisions were not a series of points tending to fix a point on a
line. '39 There is a solid social reason, I suggest, for minimal
efforts to place pornography under legal regulation. Such efforts
draw the line, and the line is necessary if the obscene is to serve
its purpose. For it acquires its value only in relation to the
accepted sanctities that it challenges. If the obscene becomes
conventional, this is at the price of such sanctities. And if someone says that the obscene lies in the eye of the observer, that
there is no form of expression or conduct which, in a given society, can objectively be declared obscene, and that nothing of
value is lost in thus entirely subjectivizing the concept of obscen37. See generally THE POETIcs oF AusTOTLE (D. Margoliouth ed.
1911), and especially ch. 25.
38.

2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 28 (M. Howe ed. 1941).

39. Id.
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ity, we may take it that he sees no point in the existence in society of the belief that some areas of human relationships are
peculiarly precious. But few people, when they reflect on the
matter, are ready to take such a view.
It may well be that there is no firm statistical correlation
between exposure to erotica and a penchant for rape, but the
more significant issue to pursue-and the statistical methods or
constructed experiments of social scientists are unlikely to reach
this issue-is whether there is a difference in the behavior and
interests of people reared in cultures where the line between
the sacred and the obscene is clear and the behavior and interests of people reared in cultures where the line is vague or
nonexistent. Does anyone believe that the churches, the images
of the Virgin, the ubiquity of Christian themes and symbols, had
no effect for better or worse on the ideas about life and morality
of medieval men and women? Can it be believed that the all
but ubiquitous externalization of the interest in a depersonalized
and cruel sexuality conveys to contemporary men and women no
message comparable in force about the proper preoccupations
and goals of the human adventure? 40 The rituals and entertainments of a people are recognized in all societies as carrying
a symbolic and educational force. The law recognizes this fact
in the controls it exercises over games. That it should be
entirely indifferent to pornographic spectacles is inconsistent
with this general attitude.
But if the law has moral purposes, in what manner can it
define and defend these purposes? I will discuss this difficult
question next.
II.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE LAW TO HIGHER
MORAL PRINCIPLES

It seems to me peculiarly illuminating to examine the relationship of the law to higher moral principles if one seeks an
understanding of the role of law as a department of human

H.

40. Harry Clor has written:
People are influenced by what they think others believe and
particularly by what they think are the common standards of
The free circulation of obscenity can, in
the community ....
time, lead many to the conclusion that there is nothing wrong
with the values implicit in it-since their open promulgation is
tolerated by the public. They will come to the conclusion that
public standards have changed-or that there are no public
standards. Private standards are hard put to withstand the effects of such an opinion.
CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY 170 (1969).
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civilization. To set the stage for my examination of some of the
issues presented-I can, of course, only examine a few-let me
begin with some general observations extending my previous
remarks about the role of law in the enforcement of morality.
(1) The law is concerned, among other things, with the
behavior of individual members of society insofar as that behavior
adversely affects other individuals. Even when it operates within this limited perspective, however, the law inevitably makes
moral discriminations; it makes distinctions between kinds of
harm it tolerates and kinds of harm it does not. Thus, a business
whose aggressiveness and efficiency force other enterprises out
of business has harmed the other enterprises. Nevertheless,
assuming that its methods have been honest and that it has
operated within the principles of fair competition, this harm is
accepted by the law in deference to economic efficiency and the
presumed utility of vigorous competition in promoting that
efficiency. Implicit in such a posture, it should be evident, are
certain presuppositions about relative values. We may agree
with these presuppositions or not, but the law cannot avoid being
controlled either by these or by others. Accordingly, even when
the law restricts its attention to the harm that individuals may
directly do to others, its attention is inescapably selective, and
the principles of selection reflect antecedent moral views.
(2) The law does not-and cannot-confine its attention
simply to the direct harm that one individual's behavior may
cause other individuals. It cannot help but be concerned with the
indirect effects of individual conduct, exerted through the impact of conduct on general norms of behavior. For the strength
or weakness, clarity or vagueness, of these norms has an
influence on the general tone of society and on the horizons,
opportunities, and handicaps of its individual members. The law
in fact takes sides regularly, serving as a general instrument of
moral education. It gives symbolic expression as well as legal
sanction to certain moral values and helps to create not simply
habits of behavior but habits of critical assessment of behavior
that make these values part of people's internal systems of selfregulation. The tax laws, the civil rights laws, the indisposition
of the courts to enforce wagering contracts, the use of concepts
like "unconscionable" and "equitable" all have this side effect.
There is, to be sure, a sense of the term "neutral" which permits
us to say, as Professor Herbert Wechsler has argued, 41 that a
41. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof Constitutional Law,
73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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distinguishing feature of judicial reasoning is the search for
neutral principles. But these principles, as Professor Wechsler
has made plain, are not mo'raly neutral. Although they are
higher principles whose significance and validity transcend the
case at hand, they may well throw the weight of the political and
legal system behind one set of controverted social claims as
against another. The neutrality of the law is like the fabled
neutrality of the Irishman who, during World War II, said
"We're neutral, but the question is, neutral against who?"
Only a highly formalistic jurisprudence-a jurisprudence
controlled by the kind of black letter myopia against which the
legal realists railed-will ignore this larger moral and educational role of the law. Indeed, many of the distinctive procedures of
the law represent in themselves a divergence from, and an implicit critique of, traditional moral attitudes. Their latent educational function is the evocation and espousal of moral attitudes
deemed to be superior. That is the interpretation of the function
of law offered by Aeschylus in the Oresteia,in which he depicts
Athena descending from on high with the gift of justice and intervening to replace the traditional code of vendetta and revenge
with a legal system's methods of adjudication and compensation.
The influence of the courts in educating society in more enlightened notions of fairness was much emphasized by Justice
Brandeis, and even so happy a demystifier of the law as Thurman
Arnold described the judicial trial as "the way in which society
is trained in right ways of thought and action, not by compulsion,
' '42
but by parables which it interprets and follows voluntarily.
(3) Recognition of the moral functions of the law is particularly important today. We are all products of a searing
historical experience, extending over many centuries, and violently resurgent in the contemporary world, in which governments
and states have taken the condition of the souls of their subjects
as a major concern and expended more effort seeing to it that
they professed approved ideologies than that they lived in conditions of minimal physical decency or social justice. You will
inevitably share, as I do, John Stuart Mill's fear that ff the
law takes the guardianship of morals to be its proper sphere,
human individuality and human liberty may be crushed. I think
this fear is real, not fabricated. But there are other policies
calling for reasonable fear as well.
42.

T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 129 (1935).
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Protesting against paternalistic legislation designed to protect the morals of the members of society, Mill wrote, "If society
lets any considerable number of its members grow up mere
children, incapable of being acted on by rational consideration
of distant motives, society has itself to blame for the consequences."4 3 Given society's great powers of education, he argued,
given the authority of established opinion and the natural
penalties like condemnation and derision which fall on those
who deviate from the norms, society ought not to pretend
that it also needs "the power to issue commands and enforce
obedience in the personal concerns of individuals . . . . 44 But
when the powers of schools, established opinion, and accepted
mores fade, when large and conspicuous parts of the environment work against the influence of family and a society's declared standards, we cannot easily defend the proposition that
society may absolutely not use the law to deal with the causes or
results of this decay in the traditional agencies of moral education. If we do, we are shoving the problem off on an abstraction, "society," on which we blame the existence of the problem,
while preventing society, in a concrete fashion, from using one
of the few instruments that may be available to it.
(4) But the law-at any rate, the law in a free society-faces
serious limitations in its ability to enforce moral norms. It
cannot invade people's homes, or exercise tyrannical methods of
thought control, or impose the attitudes of the majority on a
minority without compelling reasons. In particular, it is limited
by the requirements of due process. Morals legislation is peculiarly susceptible to the vices of imprecision and arbitrariness.
Moreover, morality involves matters of highly individualized
judgment in highly individualized contexts, in relation to which
the instruments of the law are often blunt or cruel.
(5) Nevertheless, the law is not without powers of more
subtle adjustment to the peculiar issues presented by its function
as moral arbiter and guide. It need not take sides on the
issues at every point. To take an example-I offer it without
comment pro or con-the law can refrain from granting homosexuals the right to marry their sexual partners, but it can also
decriminalize homosexuality and tolerate public arguments in
its favor. The legal system's purposes are not restricted to the
prohibition of what it disfavors, and its means are not limited to
43. J.S. MLL, supra note 5, at 101.
44.

Id. at 102.
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those of the criminal law. Its purpose can be simply that of
signalling and reinforcing a moral bias, and to carry out this
purpose it can use tax laws, zoning laws, education laws, public policies in employment, housing, and urban planning, and
judge-made laws in the fields of contract and torts, to name only
a few of the devices available to it.
(6) In fulfilling this role, which it cannot escape, as a moral
arbiter and guide, the legal system in a free society faces a
fundamental philosophical issue. It cannot help but reflect the
moral traditions of the community in which it functions. But
where these moral traditions are diverse, it has either to make a
choice among them or decide, on some sort of rational ground,
that it should keep at arm's length. Moreover, there may be
some moral attitudes well established in a community and shared
by the overwhelming proportion of its members which the legal
system must not support and may indeed be under an obligation
to combat. How, then, can the law decide which of the moral
standards of a community it should accept and enforce or encourage, which it should be neutral towards, and which, if the
necessity arises, it must resist?
To answer this question, the law needs some conception,
however incomplete and unfinished, of its commanding moral
purposes, and it is to the exploration of such a conception that I
now turn. I wish to ask how, if at all, the law can receive
guidance in the performance of its moral role. Are there principles inscribed in human reason and nature that will perform this
guiding task? Are there notions inherent in the idea of law
itself? Is the concept of fundamental human rights perhaps a
clue to the manner in which the law should exercise its inescapable moral responsibilities?

Let me turn first to the notion that an examination of
human reason and nature will yield the higher moral principles
that we seek. This is the doctrine of Natural Law. No more
lucid or influential interpreter of this doctrine has lived than St.
Thomas Aquinas, who describes Natural Law as follows:
[T]here is in man a natural and initial inclination to good which
he has in common with all substances; in so far as every substance seeks its own preservation according to its own nature.
Corresponding to this inclination, the natural law contains all
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that makes for the preservation of human life, and all that is
opposed to its dissolution. Secondly, there is to be found in man
a further inclination to certain more specific ends, according to
the nature which man shares with other animals. In virtue of
this inclination there pertains to the natural law all those in-

stincts 'which nature has taught all animals,' such as sexual relationship, the rearing of offspring, and the like. Thirdly, there
is in man a certain inclination to good, corresponding to his rational nature ....

So man has a natural inclination to know

the truth about God and to live in society. In this respect there
come under the natural law, all actions connected with such inclinations: namely, that a man should avoid ignorance, that he
with whom he must associate
must not give offence to others
45
and all actions of like nature.
What inescapably strikes the attention in this classic account
of Natural Law is the equivocal character of what it communicates. St. Thomas speaks of human inclinations and at least

some of the inclinations he describes are universal facts. It is
impossible for any normal human being, for example, not to have
sexual inclinations. But some of the inclinations St. Thomas ascribes to man are surely not invariable-for example, the inclination to rear offspring. And some, like the inclination to live
in society, can coexist with inclinations to perform actions not in
conformity with what St. Thomas declares to be a natural lawfor example, the obvious inclination that some people have to give
offense to other people with whom they must associate. In brief,
there are two meanings of "law"-law as a description of observed regularities and law as a norm directing individuals to
certain kinds of action. If "Natural Law" is descriptive law,
there is no need to counsel human beings to follow it; if it is
normative, they are clearly free to break it. And the problem in
Natural Law is to explain why descriptive statements about
human inclinations are evidence for the validity of normative
directives about them.
There is a sense, of course, in which statements of fact are
logically relevant to decisions about how people ought to behave.
If you don't want to risk broken limbs, don't defy the laws of
gravity by spreading your arms and attempting to fly from one
roof to a roof thirty yards away. If you wish to work at peace
with other people, don't give them needless offense. Because
most of us share such desires, the obedience to such rules seems
to us "natural" and mandatory. But we must note that our
obligation to live by such rules is, from a logical point of view,
45. AQUINAS,

SuTmmA THEOLOGICA, Qu. 94, Art. 2, conclusion (J.G.
LLOYD, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 72

Dawson trans.), reprinted in
(1959)

[hereinafter cited as SUmmA

THEOLOGICA].
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purely hypothetical. It depends on our being interested in
attaining the ends to which observance of these rules is a means.
Accordingly, if Natural Law is to give us categorically
binding ends, it can only do so by supposing, first, that the
universe is teleologically organized and, second, that there is a
categorical moral imperative commanding man to pursue the
ends this teleology sets for him. But no such imperative can be
derived from a teleology that is merely descriptive, and the question for the advocate of Natural Law is how he arrives at a prescriptive teleology. Although certain general ends, for example,
the goal of self-preservation, are shared by most people, these
ends are broad and leave immense room for variation within
them. The need for food, for example, can be satisfied by
cannibalism; the need to rear offspring can be met by polygamy,
polyandry, or the abolition of the family and the creation of
public institutions for the care of children. The adherent of
Natural Law tells us very little unless he tells us which of these
ways we ought to adopt as the "natural" way, and he cannot
tell us this only by invoking our universal "inclinations."
The mixture of the descriptive and the normative, together
with the ineradicable vagueness of all assertions to the effect that
man has certain natural ends or goals, represent an insoluble
problem, so far- as I can see, for the Natural Lawyer's effort to
deduce basic moral laws from the universal facts of human
nature alone. Thus, the eminent twentieth century Thomist,
Jacques Maritain, has written:
[M]an possesses ends which necessarily correspond to his essential constitution and which are the same for all-as all pianos,
for instance, whatever their particular type and in whatever
place they may be, have as their end the production of certain
attuned sounds. If they do not produce
these sounds they must
be tuned or discarded as worthless. 46
But this is not so. They can be cut up and used as firewood, as
soldiers in the field have been known to use them. They can be
used for this "unnatural" purpose even if they are capable of
producing the sounds for which their designers intended them. It
is not from our natural ends that we learn that we must, for
example, forego abortion. It is from the specific and indispensable interpretation of these ends by particular people or moral
traditions. But the claim these people or traditions may make
to exclusive understanding of the Word of Nature is not selfcertifying.
46.

J.

MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE

86 (1951).
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Moreover, Natural Law is not quite, I think, what it seems
to be. One of its obvious appeals is that, at least for those who
accept the doctrine, it provides what seems to be a system of
absolute, inviolable laws. It removes us from the realm of the
contingent, the hypothetical, the experimental, the doubtful. But
is this really so? St. Thomas, at any rate, was too judicious to
think so. He said that so far as the general principles of reason
are concerned there is one standard of truth or rightness for
everybody. But he added:
When we come to the particular conclusions of the practical reason, however, there is neither the same standard of truth or
rightness for everyone, nor are these conclusions equally known
to all. All people, indeed, realize that it is right and true to
act according to reason. And from this principle we may deduce
as an immediate conclusion that debts must be repaid. This conclusion holds in the majority of cases. But it could happen in
some particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore
irrational, to repay a debt; if, for instance, the money repaid
were used to make war against one's own country. Such exceptions are all the more likely to occur the more we get down to
The more specialized the conditions apparticular cases ....
plied, the greater is the possibility of an exception arising . . . . 47
This is an astute account of the way in which rules of law
and morals are reinterpreted and reconstructed in the course of
their everyday application to specific cases. But it can give no
comfort whatsoever to those who seek in Natural Law relief
from the problems of relative values and the balancing of interests. The fact is that, Natural Lawyers or not, people rarely
argue seriously about general moral principles such as whether
debts should be repaid. They argue about whether a debt is
legitimate, or whether specific conditions are present that excuse
or oblige nonpayment. In the application of general principles
to particular cases we return to our human, fallible, and often
idiosyncratic judgments, and Natural Law offers us little guidance. The search for higher moral principles that will be of help
in determining how the law should discharge its responsibilities
is not satisfied, I believe, by resort to this doctrine.

. Another effort to find such principles consists in looking to
law itself and extracting the needed principles from its essential
47. SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Qu. 94, Art. 4, conclusion, reprinted in
LLOYD, supra note 45, at 73.
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purpose. One of the most ingenious and probably best-known
efforts of this sort is that of Professor Lon Fuller.48 There is, he
argues, an "inner morality" of the law, a "morality that makes
40
law possible." This inner morality has eight parts.
First, the law must consist of rules; otherwise it is not law
but a procession of ad hoc decisions. Second, the law must be
publicized. The affected parties must know the rules they are
expected to observe. Third, the rules must be prospective, not
retroactive; if this maxim is violated, the law will not be a usable
guide to decision and action. Fourth, the rules must be understandable; again, the purpose of the law as a guide to decision
necessitates this characteristic of law. Fifth, and for the same
reason, the rules of the law cannot be contradictory. Sixth, they
cannot require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party.
Seventh, the laws cannot be so frequently changed that the
subject cannot orient his action by them. Eighth, there has to
be a congruence between the rules as announced and the rules as
they are administered. Otherwise, once again, the law will not
be a safe and sound basis for deciding how to behave.
"A total failure in any one of these eight directions does not
simply result in a bad system of law," says Professor Fuller, "it
results in something that is not properly called a legal system at
all, except perhaps in the Pickwickian sense in which a void
contract can still be said to be one kind of contract."50 But I
confess that I find these eight maxims, together with the characterization of their importance which r have just quoted, somewhat perplexing.
Let me ask, first, why a system of rules which fails in one
or another of these ways cannot be called a system of law,
except in a Pickwickian sense. Let us suppose that coercive
sanctions are attached to its rules, that specifiable officials are
empowered to interpret these rules and apply the pertinent
sanctions, that there are also rules for deciding conflicts and
doubts and for changing the rules, and that the inhabitants of
the territory to which these rules are applied generally, even if
not invariably, act in obedience to this system. This is a rough
but conventional definition of a legal system which I should wish
to refine in a number of ways, but it will do for our present
purposes. What are the reasons for regarding such a definition
See L. FULLER,
49. Id. at 46-91.
50. Id. at 39.
48.

THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed.

1964).
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as insufficient and adding the characteristics on which Professor
Fuller insists? I am afraid I do not see any, especially in view of
his declaration that departure from any one of his eight conditions disqualifies a system as a legal system.
Legal systems have made it a crime for people not to
believe in the officially sanctioned God, surely a requirement
that lies beyond the power of an unbeliever. Shall we say that
they were not legal systems for this reason? The edicts of Hitler
and Stalin were often ad hoc and sometimes, in order to spread
terror, deliberately unpublicized. It is, at the very least, an abuse
of common usage to say that, for this reason, Nazi Germany and
Stalinist Russia had no legal systems. The rules of the Internal
Revenue Service are surely not easily understandable. Do they
lose their legal status for this reason? And administrative law in
general is the scene of rapidly changing regulations, yet it is
disconcerting to be informed that the Securities and Exchange
Commission or the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is not an agency of the law.
To such objections it might be said, as Professor Fuller
suggests in some of his arguments, that where the law falls short
of the ideals he describes, it is only law in a half-way world, law
pointing towards goals it has not fully achieved, like a sapling on
the way to being an oak tree. A legal system, as he says, is an
"enterprise," and, in his words, "both rules of law and legal
systems can and do half exist." 51 But this requires us to reserve
the word "law" in its full meaning only for ideal legal systems
that exist nowhere. It is, in effect, a prescription to remake our
language, and to use the word "law" only eulogistically. If we
follow this prescription we shall, however, have to find a new
word to describe the imperfect systems we have and to distinguish them from other kinds of codes like conventional morality,
primitive custom, or the rules of a country club. We shall be
right back where we are now, in other words, except that we shall
be encumbered by the obligation-which probably lies beyond our
powers of fulfillment-to remember that an ordinary English
word may not be used in its ordinary way. Professor Fuller
asserts that "[t] his inconvenience may ... be offset by the
capacity of such a view to make us perceive essential similarities" 12 between the legal enterprise and other rule-making enter51. Id. at 122.
52. Id. at 129.
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prises. But it is surely possible to detect these similarities
without creating a new vocabulary. We do not have to call a
mouse half a rat in order to notice that the two animals have
traits in common.
Indeed, let me approach Professor Fuller's suggestion from
quite the opposite point of view. He argues that the eight

conditions he describes, though based only on an examination of
the inner character of law itself, nevertheless constitute a "morality" in the peculiar sense of that word. This is because, in his

words, there is a
view of man implicit in the internal morality of law ....
To
embark on the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the
governance of rules involves of necessity a commitment to the
view that man is, or can become, a responsible agent, capable
of understanding and following rules, and answerable for his defaults.
Every departure from the principles of the law's inner morality is an affront to man's dignity as a responsible agent.53
I can only say that though I may be revealing my own inadequacies, I cannot extract a distinctive view about the dignity of
man from a review of the principles that Mr. Fuller holds to be
constitutive of the law's inner morality.
With which of these principles could we break and train a
dog efficiently?5 4 You cannot train a dog by ad hoc reactions
to his behavior, or by keeping your demands on him secret from
him, or by enforcing retroactive rules, or being unintelligible, or
issuing contradictory commands, or asking him to do what lies
beyond his powers, or changing the. rules rapidly, or not keeping
your word and denying him his bone when you've promised it. I
do not mean, in drawing this analogy, to deny the dignity of
man. I do not, for that matter, mean to deny the dignity of
dogs, for many of whom I have affection and for some of whom
I have learned to have great respect. I mean only to convey the
thought that the inner morality of the law of which Mr. Fuller
speaks in such high terms is only a set of homely and hardly
recondite instructions for teaching any creature capable of
learned behavior. Why these principles should be called, eulogistically, a "morality" I am at a loss to say, and I do not believe

53. Id. at 162.
54. I owe this canine analogy to my colleague, Professor R. Kent
Greenawalt.
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they are sufficient to support the high ethical commitments which
Mr. Fuller seeks to build on their foundation.

Let me now turn to a third and final example of an effort
to establish the content of the moral obligations of the law-a
final example, that is, before I put my own head on the block
and offer some suggestions of my own. This effort is by far the
most popular at the present moment and has stimulated a
major redirection of thought and attention not only in jurisprudence and social philosophy but in many other fields such as
sociology and economics. I speak, I probably need not say, of
the revival in contemporary form, properly reinforced by decision theory and techniques of analytic philosophy, of the classic
liberal social contract and natural rights theories. Professors
John Rawls 55 and Robert Nozick, 56 both of Harvard, are perhaps the best-known representatives of this revival. In jurisprudence, Professor Ronald Dworkin37 is a prominent spokesman
for a similar revival, and it is probably natural that, at the
moment, he too is at Harvard.
I have discussed the ideas of Professors Rawls, Nozick, and
Dworkin at other times, 58 and I shall not repeat what I have
said. I must emphasize, too, that Professors Rawls and Nozick
disagree with each other on a number of fundamental issues
and that Professor Dworkin, though he has been explicit in
urging the truth and significance of what he believes to be the
essence of the classic liberal philosophy, has carefully stopped
short of saying that he is restating either social contract or natural rights theory. Accordingly, what I propose to put before you
is a position which I shall not attribute to any of these scholars.
It seems to me in harmony with much of what they say, but I
offer it as a hypothetical case study useful in its own right and
with some relevance to the present reexamination of the resources of the social contract tradition.

55. See generally J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
56. See generally R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
57. See generally R. DwomaN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977),

and especially pp. xiv-xv and chs. 2, 3, 7, 12, & 13.
58. See Frankel, The New Egalitarianismand the Old, 56 COMmENTARY 54 (Sept. 1973); Frankel, Political Disobedience and the Denial of
Political Authority, 2 SOCIAL THEORY AIM PRACTICE 85 (Spring 1976);
Frankel, Book Review, 5 CoLuM. HumAN RIGHTS L. REV. 547 (1973)
(RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE).
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Let us create an imaginary experiment for ourselves. How
would people think, what rules would they be prepared to accept
as just, if they were disengaged from their historical heritage and
existing social surroundings and placed in conditions in which
their disagreements with others could not be settled by power
or custom or appeals to established authority? Let us imagine,
too, that by some alchemy these people are, in a sense, disengaged
from themselves. They are human beings and so, of course, they
put their own interests first, but they do not know what their
own interests are beyond the fact that they may and probably
will collide from time to time with the interests of others. They
are like card players each of whom knows that he wants to win,
but each of whom is bidding on blind hands. Yet they do know
something about the general conditions of human life and the
various strategies of bidding, and, armed with this information,
they set out to devise rules for the distribution of the burdens
and benefits of their shared existence. What kind of rules would
these people, emancipated from local and temporal prejudices
and unable to take account of their purely idiosyncratic tastes or
special positions in the social order, decide to adopt?
This, in a general way, is the question that the traditional
theory of the social contract is designed to answer. And, broadly
speaking, there are two types of answers to it. One is to deal
with the question as though the problem it posed was to work
out a strategy of self-preservation, including in that term not
simply survival but the insuring of conditions in which, whatever
his purposes turn out to be, the individual has a reasonable opportunity to achieve them. The second is to take as a point of
departure the insight that all the individuals concerned are separate, autonomous beings, endowed with certain characteristics,
such as powers of reason and powers of decision, and to say that
they are therefore endowed with certain fundamental rights that
must be built into any system of law and justice they devise. I
shall consider each of these strategies in turn.
The basic problem in the first strategy, it seems to me, is
that the individuals concerned simply do not have enough information to reach any conclusions they can rationally defend. One possible tactic, for example, is to imagine the worst
possible situation and devise safeguards against it. Would not
an individual be reasonable, it might be argued, if he opted for
rules that would protect him if his worst enemies were to come
to power? With this assumption, he will develop, as he thinks
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through the matter, something very close, perhaps, to the rules
and basic rights characteristic of constitutional political systems.
But we must notice a crucial assumption that must be made
to adopt this tactic. The individual must be highly averse to
risk. How does he know, in his psychologically disengaged
condition, that he is that kind of individual? How does he know
that he is not a lion instead of a fox? And the same sort of
problem of insufficient information affects every other tactic that
might be devised, so far as I can see. Indeed, the information
needed to make a decision goes far beyond data about one's
personal predilections. It necessarily includes social, cultural,
and historical information. In its essence the problem is
this: we cannot decide what conditions are satisfactory or just
apart from knowledge of the purposes or goals we seek. Accordingly, I am unpersuaded that a set of rules definitive of justice
can be established on social contract grounds alone and independent of some stipulation as to the ideals or aims that human
beings should seek. The social contract approach, at any rate in
its contemporary form, is an effort to separate the search for
higher principles of justice from antecedent conceptions, which
are bound to vary, of excellences that define a good life. I do
not believe that this separation is logically possible.
The strategy that begins with the assertion of individual
natural rights strikes me as equally doomed. It is, of course, a
bare physical fact, independent of social mores, that individuals,
with the exception of Siamese twins and fetuses in the womb, are
visibly separate. That is part (though only part) of what we
mean by calling them "individuals." But it does not follow, so
far as I can see, that they are therefore socially independent, or
that the social web that connects them is a secondary or artificial
circumstance, much less one that can be treated as though it
were created by design and only to serve purposes that individuals in isolation from one another would accredit. Nor does it
follow from the undeniable facts that individuals are also idiosyncratic and that they engage in internal processes of thought and
decision not identical with those of any other individual and not
wholly communicable to others that they are independent either
factually or morally. If they are assigned rights, this is a social
act, not a recognition of antecedent verities.
It is regularly argued by those who hold a view of this sort
that there are two great advantages to it. First, it makes rights
primary, not social goals. It therefore protects individuals from
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being sacrificed to collective policies; it keeps society from
treating people as means to ends. Second, it does not impose
purposes and obligations on the individual on the wholly arbitrary ground that this is the will of the civilization into which he
happens to be born. There is much to be said for the concerns
that prompt this point of view. But with regard to the first
advantage, it must be noticed that the rights of individuals may
be sacrificed not only in the name of broad social purposes, but
also in the name of other peoples' rights-for example, property
rights. Unless it can be argued that a system of well-constructed
rights will never contain any such conflicts between different
rights as those envisaged, for example, by St. Thomas, such a
system offers no safeguard against sacrificing the rights of some
individuals to satisfy the rights of others. Indeed, once we recognize that there are conflicts between rights, the decision between
them must depend not on the abstract assertion of rights but on
their specific content. How this content is to be assigned and
evaluated apart from an examination of the goals or ends to be
served I find a mystery.
Nor do I find persuasive the argument that there is something arbitrary as a matter of general principle in imposing the
purposes and obligations of an existing civilization on the individuals who, through no choice of their own, become members
of it. To begin with, there is the suspicious taint of a kind of
occultism in this argument. No one asks to be born, to be sure.
But the situation of a fetus, or a human being not yet biologically
conceived, is not to be compared to that of an adult who, say,
finds himself at the front lines and complains that he is there
through no choice of his own. The fetus-or the abstract possibility of existence that we dub "I" when we say "I did not
ask to be born'-has no determinate will either to be born or
not to be. The conscript, it may be supposed, has some formed
preferences on how he would like to spend his time. I did not
choose to speak English, to be born in the twentieth century, or
to come under the jurisdiction of American laws from the moment of my conception. But none of these circumstances were
forced on me; there was no me on which to force them. The me
of which r speak is indeed partially defined by just these circumstances. I retain, to be sure, some large choices about what
to do with these circumstances. But to speak of the values and
purposes of a civilization as being arbitrarily imposed wholesale
on individuals is to say nothing more, so far as I can see, than
that all coming into being and passing away is "arbitrary."
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But perhaps those who can find no grounds for imposing
the obligations of an inherited civilization on individuals without
their free and autonomous consent mean something else when
they use the term "arbitrary." They mean, to be specific, that the
consent of the individual is a necessary condition for the legitimacy of the obligations assigned to him, or at least his consent
to the general procedures that lead to the assignment of these
obligations. Or else they mean that his obligations are nothing
more than the reverse coin of the rights of other individuals. But
this is to presuppose all the points at issue-the existence of rights
apart from a social framework, the moral independence of the
individual, and, not least, the definition of what is morally
"arbitrary."
If "arbitrary" means the violation of a rule, then the imposition of social obligations on unconsenting individuals is arbitrary only if the requirement of consent is, without agreement,
accepted. But the acceptance of such a rule is itself logically
arbitrary. It follows from no principle antecedent to it. Indeed, it might be asked whether there are not individuals, many
of them, who autonomously reject the right to autonomy, who
do not consent to the rule of consent and really prefer another
basis for the organization of society. In the end, the argument
that individuals are endowed, outside any specific historical or
legal context, and independent of the aspirations of society, with
independent moral rights, though it seeks a universalistic morality, is peculiarly parochial. It is an assertion that expresses the
beliefs of people in a certain tradition and, furthermore, takes
that tradition, with its emphasis on consent, to be the only natural and reasonable human tradition. rin its pragmatic consequences it shows not regard for human individuality and diversity but an impatience with them.

Is there an alternative? Let me, with diffidence, suggest one.
I would take a cue from what is surely a distinctive feature of
the classic liberal view of the higher moral principles that should
guide and confine the law. This is the stress on procedures, on
ways of conducting the social competition, in contrast with the
concern in other traditions with the realization of a social vision
in which competition will be replaced by harmony and all complaints of injustice will be stilled because injustice will be gone.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:921

This emphasis on procedures is not all there is to the liberal constitutional political tradition, but it is a good part of it and a
central part, and since I feel no duty to pull my first principles
out of the eternal heavens, I am content to use it as my point of
departure.
I believe there are certain facts of the human condition, at
any rate in complex and sophisticated societies, which are ubiquitous: the diversity of human tastes, the partiality of human
affections, the need for withdrawal and privacy as well as
solidarity, the impossibility that even very reasonable and entirely selfless men and women will arrive, without being coerced, at
unanimous judgments about the decisions and policies that society
ought to adopt either in general or with regard to specific cases.
We carry our genes and our biographies with us, and, like our
fingerprints, no man's or woman's judgment is identical to any
other's. So there is an indelibly private element in all judgment,
and though we may do our best, and sometimes succeed, in being
objective and impartial, there is always a reason to suspect that
subjectivity and partiality remain. Under these circumstances,
a system of rights creating a sphere of protected individual
thought and conduct seems at least prima facie a prudent course.
Without it, values of the broadest appeal-trust, honesty, personal
friendships and family attachments, the chance peaceably to
review the ideas and policies accepted in society, the pursuit of
truth wherever we choose to pursue it-lose their security. And
I take it that the liberal constitutional emphasis on procedures
receives its impulse from some such outlook.
But as I have stressed, it is impossible to settle conflicts of
rights or to give sense to a system of rights as a whole without
some attention not only to rules, rights, and procedures but also
to ends and purposes. Liberal constitutionalism is frequently
faulted on the ground that it is merely procedural, not substantive, and that proceduralism in and for itself is mere form, lacking both a reasonable ground and an emotional appeal. I think
this charge justified when it is addressed to some of the most
conventional philosophical interpretations of liberal principles.
But I do not believe the charge is justified when it is addressed
to a liberal constitutional philosophy coherently conceived. For
I believe that the philosophy of liberal constitutionalism, when
it is pulled together, contains, like any other social outlook, a
conception of a guiding purpose, a moral ideal.
Given the description of the human condition with which
liberal constitutionalism begins, and given the value it ascribes to
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family, personal loves and friendships, the integrity of the inner
life, and the arts, sciences, and diversities of a complex civilization, that ideal, I suggest, is a certain conception of human
excellence. It begins with an idea of the individual as never
wholly mappable, as having energies and aspirations that will
not be neatly encased in any social box or ascribed status or vision
of an ultimate civic harmony. But it goes beyond this. While
recognizing the plurality of human attitudes and possibilities, it
also gives special favor to a particular kind of intellectually
flexible and morally dispassionate individual. Oliver Wendell
Holmes came very close to catching the essence of the ideal I
have in mind when he defined a civilized man as a man who can
act with conviction even while doubting his first principles. An
individual of this sort has an identity of his own; he is distinguishable, he distinguishes himself, from his ascribed status and
social or cultural box; he is mobile intellectually and morally,
able to imagine the reality of other points of view and their
plausibility to those who hold them. And he desires the competition of ideas and values because he cannot imagine his own
independence if that competition does not take place.
This is not the only acceptable ideal of human excellence.
It is not the only ideal that a liberal society can recognize or
respect. As the cliche rightly holds, a liberal society is, or ought
to be, pluralistic. But it is this sort of individual who plays an
indispensable part in maintaining that pluralism and in keeping
it from descending into a humorless battle of ideologies or a
complacent agreement to live and let live by refusing to ask
any troublesome questions. So the educational systems of such
a society must give special attention to the cultivation of this
form of human excellence; and insofar as the laws belong to that
educational system, they must do their part, cherishing this ideal,
and, absent compelling and immediate necessities, taking its side
when sides must be taken.
A society ought to be judged, Pericles and Plato held at the
dawn of the ideal of liberal civilization, by the nature of the
people it produces. Its ideals are to be appraised by the character of the people it especially prizes and at whose preservation
and reproduction it aims. This was the judgment, too, of Spinoza,
Milton, and Mill, and in their defenses of liberty it is the ideal of
the freely thinking individual that holds everything together.
There are certain questions, they held, about which an individual
must make his own separate peace with his Maker or with himself. These are the great questions about God, freedom, and
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immortality, about truth, about how he should conduct himself
in those intimate and personal affairs that no outsider, and certainly no government, can take over from him without bungling
the issues and treating him like a child. rf we are to earn salvation, we have to put our souls in jeopardy, Milton thought. We
have to be free to make up our own minds and act accordingly.
Spinoza, Mill, and Kant, for all their differences from Milton,
did not think differently on this point. They did not suppose
that virtue could be defined as passive compliance with rules one
has no chance to disobey. Virtue was a condition of the personality that depended on the exercise of choice.
That ideal is the central source of light, I suggest, for
understanding the moral environment of law in a liberal constitutional society. The aspiration towards it is central in the
assertion that all men should be credited with the rights to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. These are not logically
self-evident rights. They are not rights whose inviolability can
be ascertained independently of any conception of the social
purpose, or of the excellences most admirable in human beings.
But these rights will be self-evident in the quite ordinary, nontechnical sense of the term, to men and women who wish to be
independent, responsible, self-questioning human beings, and
wish the same conditions for any of their fellows who will permit
them to live by this ideal.

